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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE AcTION
VERTER AFTER GRANT OF DETERMINABLE

REQUIRED FOR OPERATION OF REFEE

The Charlotte Park & Recreation Commission, a municipal corporation, is
charged with the responsibility of administering and maintaining the park and
recreation facilities for the city of Charlotte, North Carolina. In May of 1929,
Mr. Osmond Barringer conveyed by deed to the Commission, as a gift, certain
lands for use as a park, playground and recreational system of the city of Charlotte. In this deed was a provision that the lands so conveyed were "for the use
of ...persons of the white race only." The deed also provided that if this condition was not met, then the lands would revert to Osmond Barringer. On a part
of these lands the Bonnie Brae Golf Course was established; it is the only golf
course operated and maintained by the Commission. All Negroes were and are
denied the right to use it.
More than twenty years after execution of the deed, the Commission, perhaps
prompted by a petition signed by a number of Negroes who claimed that their
constitutional rights were being violated, instituted an action for a declaratory
judgment to determine what the legal effect would be if Negroes were allowed to
use the Bonnie Brae Golf Course. This was the case of CharlottePark & Recreation Com'n v. Barringer.' In 1955, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rendered its decision: The racially discriminatory provision was valid, and the lands,
if used by non-whites, would "automatically" revert to Osmond Barringer. The
United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.2 If this decision is
correct, then the North Carolina court has hit upon one of the few methods, if not
the only one, which can be successfully used today for the purpose of perpetuating
racial discrimination by means of restrictive provisions in land deeds. But this
writer respectfully suggests that the decision is not correct.
Prior to 1948, it was generally conceded that privately created covenants or
conditions restricting land against occupancy or use by persons of certain races,
or by non-Caucasions in general, were valid and enforceable.3 The state and federal courts were available, if necessary, to enforce these private arrangements. In
1948, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,4 ruled
that the enforcement by state courts of covenants restricting the use or occupancy
of real property to persons of the Caucasian race violated the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that case, the
prayer was that the court restrain certain Negroes from taking possession of restricted property, and that judgment be entered divesting title out of the Negroes
and revesting it in the grantor. The court denied such relief. This was the first
case in which the United States Supreme Court was called upon to consider the
enforceability in state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color. In
1 Charlotte Park & Recreation Com'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955).

2350 U.S. 983 (1956).
3 Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944); Gospel Spreading Assoc. v.
Bennetts, 79 App. D.C. 352, 147 F.2d 878 (1945); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A.
330 (1938) ; Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947-reversed 1948) ; Perkins
v. Monroe Ave. Church of Christ, 79 Ohio App. 457, 70 N.E.2d 487 (1946) ; Doherty v. Rice,
240 Wis. 389, 3 N.W.2d 734 (1942).
4 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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one previous case, Corrigan v. Buckley, 5 the court had held that such agreements
between private property owners were valid, but the question of state enforcement was not in issue. In Hansberry v. Lee, 6 the only other United States Supreme
Court case which involved racial restrictive covenants prior to the Shelley decision, the court arrived at its conclusion without reaching the issues presented in
the Shelley case. None of these three cases (Shelley, Corrigan, and Hansberry)
involved a provision for "automatic" reverter of ownership for a breach of the
covenant or failure of the condition. In the Charlotte case, however, an "automatic" reverter of ownership in fee to the grantor was provided for in case the7
condition was not performed; the grant, therefore, was of a determinable fee.
Thus it appears that the Charlotte case holds that a grantor may convey land in
fee simple determinable, with a provision for racial restriction and a clause providing that the land will revert to the grantor if the condition is broken, and that
such an arrangement, even if it subsequently operates to deprive the grantee of
his land, is not within the inhibitions of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution. For this to be so, the process whereby ownership of the land reverts
to the grantor must be accomplished without "state action," because the inhibition in the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that no agency of the state
-legislative, executive, or judicial-no instrumentality, and no person, officer or
agent exerting power of the state shall deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed to all persons by the 14th Amendment.8 The private agreements themselves
may be valid, but they cannot be enforced by the use of any state facility. This
principle was crystallized in the Shelley case, where the court said:
".... [T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation
of any rights guaranteed ... by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purpose
of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would
appear clear that there had been no action by the State and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated." 9

The North Carolina court in the Charlotte case conceded that this was the law,
but went on to say that it was not applicable in the case of a determinable fee.
The court said:
"It is a distinct characteristic of a fee determinable upon limitation that the estate
automatically reverts at once on the occurrence of the event by which it is limited ....

,10

Later in the same opinion the court said:
"The operation of this reversion provision is not by any judicial enforcement by the
State courts of North Carolina, and Shelley v. Kraemer . . . has no application."'l

In reference to this latter statement, it seems fair to assume that the North Carolina court probably meant to say that no state action whatever was involved,
rather than limiting the statement to judicial action by the state. At least that
5 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
8311 U.S. 32 (1940).
7 1 TnrpANY, R A. PROPERTY §§ 217-220 (3d ed. 1939) ; BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 181-184
(1943).
sVirginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); U.S. Government Printing Office, Constitution of the United States Annotated, p.411 (1953).
9334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
10242 N.C. 311, 321, 88 S.E.2d 114, 122 (1955).
11242 N.C. 311, 322, 88 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1955).
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would seem to be the requisite as laid down by the United States Supreme Court.
Our problem, then, is to determine whether the operation of a reverter provision
involves state action in any form. If it does, then the North Carolina court's decision in the Charlotte case is necessarily inconsistent with the position taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Shelley and related cases.' 5
First of all, the "automatic" feature of any reverter provision is not truly automatic-it obviously depends for its vitality on at least the sanction of some governing power, namely the state. Without this recognition, this positive acknowledgment, how could ownership be said to leave the grantee and revert to the
grantor? This result cannot be achieved in a vacuum; definite concepts of law
are involved. And law, in the sense here used, may be said to be the product of
Man operating through his instrumentality, the state. 4 Whether it be common
law, or statute, or whatever else it might be called, nevertheless the sovereign
power is speaking, and where the sovereign speaks, state action exists. The opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Barrows v. Jackson 5 seems to support
such a theory. The court there, speaking of the unconstitutionality of compelling
a party to respond in damages for failure to perform a covenant to continue to
discriminate against non-Caucasians in the use of real property, said:

"The result of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use of restrictive

covenants. To that extent, the State would act to put its sanction behind the covenants." 16 (Emphasis added.)

And the court went on to say:
"Thus it becomes not respondent's voluntary choice but the State's choice that she
observe her covenant .... 17

Without the positive rules of real property law as recognized and applied by the
state, the physical possession of all land might well be in the strongest. But instead, the state has determined the effect which must result from a given cause.
If ownership reverts, it is only because the state has said that it will revert-the
state must act.
Going a step further, let us suppose for a moment that a non-Caucasian insists
that he be permitted to use the Bonnie Brae Golf Course, and forces his way onto
the grounds. The Commission, waving its declaratory judgment from the North
Carolina Supreme Court, seeks the aid of a policeman in removing the unwelcome
visitor. Presumably the policeman's duty will be to take action against the intruder. It might be argued that the officer would be merely enforcing the owner's
right to exclude others from his land, and that such is not state action of a discriminatory nature. But this view loses sight of the fact that the Commission as
12 See note 8 supra. Also, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
13 It is outside the scope of this article to consider the possible reasons why the United

States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Charlotte case. The petition was denied without
comment.350 U.S. 983 (1956).
14 For a comprehensive treatment of society's relationship to law, see SimPsoN
LAW AND SOCIETY (1949).

15 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
16 See note 15 supra, at 254.
17 See note 15 supra, at 254.
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a municipal corporation is itself a state organ,"8 and that the policeman is acting
in his official capacity. And where, as in our example, two state agencies, a policemen and a municipal corporation, act with an eye upon a declaratory judgment
of the highest court in the state, can it be said that there is no state action? The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Flemming v.
So. Carolina Elect. & Gas Co., 19 seemed to think that there was, in a somewhat
analogous situation where bus drivers were sworn in as police officers in order that
they might enforce racial segregation aboard busses in South Carolina. In that
case a Negro woman brought an action for damages against a bus company because a bus driver, who was also a police officer, required her to change seats on
a bus in accordance with the South Carolina segregation law. The district court
dismissed the action, but this was reversed by the circuit court, which said:
"... [WJe think it clear that he [the bus driver] was acting for the defendant [bus
company] in enforcing a statute which defendant itself was required by law to enforce.
He was thus not only acting'for defendant, but also acting under color of state law." 20

From this it seems reasonable to deduce that if a policeman ejects a non-Caucasian
from the grounds of Bonnie Brae Golf Course under the circumstances related
earlier, then he too is "acting under color of state law," and doing the same sort
of thing which the circuit court in the Flemming case condemned-using his
office to aid the state in enforcing racial discrimination.
And what would happen if the grantor brought an action of ejectment against
the grantee to recover possession of the land for non-performance of the condition? It hardly seems necessary to point out that the courts would be requested
to act in such a case, and that once again this could only be state action. After
it was shown that the grantor had parted with his ownership to the grantee, the
grantor would then have the burden of showing how ownership revested in him.
Unless he relies on magic, he can only do this by pointing out the characteristics
of a determinable fee-characteristics adopted, sanctioned and acted upon by
the state.
The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that if an "automatic" reverter is to
operate, it can only do so through state action. And the Shelley case has clearly
set out the rule that a provision for racial discrimination in a deed cannot, because
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, be enforced by state
action. Hence this writer must disagree with the conclusion of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the Charlotte case, wherein that court held that a failure to
comply with a racially discriminatory provision in a grant of a determinable fee
would result in a reverter of ownership to the grantor. Such a result would appear
to be contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Shelly case and those following
it, as set out by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Albert Bianchi

1
8Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534 (1923) ; Batchelor v. Madison Park
Corp, 25 Wash.2d 907, 172 P.2d 268 (1946); People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 111. 237,
62 N.E.2d 809 (1945); Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 178 S.W2d 382 (1944); Buckhout
v. Newport, 68 RI. 280, 27 A.2d 317 (1942).
19 224 Fed.2d 752 (1955).
20 See note 19 supra, at 753.

